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Storage conditionsWastewater-based surveillance of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is used to
monitor the population-level prevalence of the COVID-19 disease. In many cases, due to lockdowns or analytical
delays, the analysis ofwastewater samplesmight only be possible after prolonged storage. In this study, the effect
of storage conditions on the RNA copy numbers of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in wastewater influent was studied and
compared to the persistence of norovirus over time at 4 °C,−20 °C, and −75 °C using the reverse-transcription
quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) assays E-Sarbeco, N2, and norovirus GII. For the first time in Finland, the presence of
SARS-CoV-2 RNAwas tested in 24 h composite influentwastewater samples collected fromViikinmäkiwastewa-
ter treatment plant, Helsinki, Finland. The detected and quantified SARS-CoV-2 RNA copy numbers of the waste-
water sample aliquots taken during 19–20 April 2020 and stored for 29, 64, and 84 days remained surprisingly
stable. In the stored samples, the SARS betacoronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 copy numbers, but not the norovirus
GII copy numbers, seemed slightly higherwhen analyzed from the pre-centrifuged pellet—that is, the particulate
matter of the influent—as compared with the supernatant (i.e., water fraction) used for ultrafiltration, although
the difference was not statistically significant. Furthermore, when wastewater was spiked with SARS-CoV-2,
linear decay at 4 °C was observed on the first 28 days, while no decay was visible within 58 days at −20 °Cand Welfare, Expert Microbiology Unit, Kuopio, Finland.
nd Research Division, Virology Unit, Helsinki, Finland.
.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
A.-M. Hokajärvi, A. Rytkönen, A. Tiwari et al. Science of the Total Environment 770 (2021) 145274or −75 °C. In conclusion, freezing temperatures should be used for storage when immediate SARS-CoV-2 RNA
analysis from thewastewater influent is not possible. Analysis of the particulatematter of the sample, in addition
to the water fraction, can improve the detection frequency.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Wastewater-based surveillance has been proposed for a rapid and
resource-efficientway tomonitor thepopulation-level prevalence of se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), an etio-
logical agent of the current global pandemic of coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) (WHO, 2020; Ahmed et al., 2020a; Lodder and de
Roda Husman, 2020; Mallapaty, 2020; Medema et al., 2020a; Orive
et al., 2020). The wastewater-based approach can provide an effective
way for identifying community-level hotspots of the infection and has
been proposed as an early warning tool, providing extra time for actions
to suppress the spread of infections before the availability of clinical sur-
veillance information (La Rosa et al., 2021; Kitajima et al., 2020;
Thompson et al., 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the analytical
capacities to study the SARS-CoV-2 RNA biomarkers from wastewater
samples has been limited due to the laboratory and campus lockdowns
at many locations with remote work recommendations. Furthermore,
the lack of required methodological resources and validated methods,
and delays in the deliveries of laboratory reagents and supplies (like
the delayed availability of the plasticware required for ultrafiltration)
due to global shortage, have hampered the immediate analysis of the
SARS-CoV-2 RNA from the collectedwastewater samples. Subsequently,
onmany occasions, researchers aiming to contribute to the fight against
COVID-19 have been forced to store the collected samples and wait for
the analytical resources to become available.
It has been claimed that the SARS-CoV-2 might have already circu-
lated in many locations before the first reports from Wuhan, China,
were received (Deslandes et al., 2020; La Rosa et al., 2021). Previously
stored samples—like those of wastewater influents collected during
the worldwide poliovirus monitoring (La Rosa et al., 2021; Hovi et al.,
2012), together with stored respiratory samples from patients
(Deslandes et al., 2020)—need to be analyzed to trace back to the first
introduction of SARS-CoV-2 in different cities of the world. After the
summer months of 2020, where the COVID-19 pandemic had a very
slow or stagnant phase in countries like Finland, the resources for the
quantitation of SARS-CoV-2 RNA fromwastewater becamemore readily
available. The analysis of stored samples might finally be possible in
many locations, although not all bottlenecks to analysis availability
have been tackled completely and the immediate actions required to
tackle the next waves of the COVID-19 pandemic might again slow
down the analysis of the previously stored samples.
It is important to determine the effect of storage conditions on the
reliability of the SARS-CoV-2 RNA results as there is usually always a
time lag between the sampling and the start of the laboratory examina-
tion due to the transportation and other logistical arrangements
(Medema et al., 2020a). So far, the persistence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in
stored wastewater samples has only been studied at higher tempera-
tures, 4 °C, 15 °C, 25 °C, and 37 °C (Ahmed et al., 2020b) and at 20 °C,
50 °C, and 70 °C (Bivins et al., 2020). Furthermore, some stability infor-
mation is obtained from other coronaviruses, like human coronavirus
229E (Gundy et al., 2008) and SARS-CoV-1 (Wang et al., 2005), or
from surrogate organisms, such as murine hepatitis virus (MHV)
(Casanova et al., 2009; Ye et al., 2016). This study aimed to establish
the SARS-CoV-2 RNA stability characteristics in cold and freezing tem-
peratures in order to evaluate the usability and reliability of the SARS-
CoV-2 RNA data gathered from previously collected and stored waste-
water samples. To do this, we followed the decay of the SARS
betacoronavirus envelope gene by using an E-Sarbeco RT-qPCR assay
(Corman et al., 2020) and the decay of the SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid2
gene by using an N2 assay (Lu et al., 2020) in wastewater influent ali-
quots stored at 4 °C, −20 °C, and −75 °C over time. As a reference
virus, the decay of norovirus genogroup II (GII), a non-enveloped
human enteric virus known for its persistence in the environment
(Kauppinen and Miettinen, 2017) and commonly found in municipal
wastewater, was used. Further, this study also compared the detection
of SARS-CoV-2 RNA copy numbers from the pre-centrifuged pellets—
that is, the particulate matter of the influent—with the supernatant
(i.e., water fraction) used for ultrafiltration. This is the first study
reporting the testing and detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA frommunicipal
wastewater in Finland.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Wastewater influent sampling and storage
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the two wastewater influent
samples collected from Viikinmäki wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP), Helsinki, Finland. The Viikinmäki WWTP serves the popula-
tion of 860,000 inhabitants from the municipalities of Helsinki, Sipoo,
Kerava, Tuusula, Järvenpää, Pornainen, Mäntsälä, and Vantaa. Samples
were collected from the influent before any treatment following the na-
tional guidance of biosafety precautions for WWTP personnel. Subsam-
ples of 5000ml and 2000ml of 24-hour composite wastewater influent
were collected from 6 °C refrigerated 20,000 ml sample container dur-
ing 19–20 April 2020 and 24–25 May 2020, respectively, and
transported to the laboratory in cool boxeswithin 24–26 h. Upon arrival
to the laboratory, the samples were divided into 30 ml aliquots and
stored at temperatures of 4 °C, −20 °C, and −75 °C for later analysis.
2.2. The ultrafiltration method for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the
stored samples
For testing the presence and stability of SARS-CoV-2 RNA, triplicate
aliquots of a single composite influent sample taken during 19–20
April 2020 was used. Frozen sample aliquots were thawed overnight
at a temperature of 4 °C before analyses.
Prior to ultrafiltration performed after storage of samples for 29, 64,
and 84 days, two 30 ml aliquots were combined and larger particles
were removed from triplicate 60 ml influent samples with pre-
centrifugation at 4654g for 30 min without brake as previously de-
scribed (Medema et al., 2020b). Then, the supernatants obtained
(57–59 ml) were concentrated using Centricon Plus-70 centrifugal fil-
ters (a 10 K device, UFC701008, Millipore Corporation). Before use, the
ultrafilters were washed with sterile deionized water, following the
manufacturer's instructions. The ultrafiltration was conducted at
3000g for 25 min, followed by concentrate collection with 1000g for
2 min, producing approximately 400 μl of concentrate.
In addition to the filtrated supernatant, the pellets from the
suspended solids removal step (pre-centrifugation) were included
into analysis soon after the importance of considering both liquid and
solid fractions of wastewater samples when analyzing enveloped vi-
ruses such as SARS-CoV-2 had been realized (see, e.g., Ahmed et al.,
2020c). The pellets were re-suspended into approximately 500 μl of su-
pernatant using widened pipette tip and analyzed from the samples
after 84 days of storage. The concentrate volume was normalized to
700 μl for all the filtrated supernatants and pre-centrifugation pellet
samples by suspending them in the filtrate and supernatant, respec-
tively. All treatment steps were carried out at room temperature.
Table 1
The characteristics of thewastewater influent at ViikinmäkiWWTP, Helsinki, Finland. The











COVID-19 cases reported in the sewerage network
area within the 14 days preceding the sampling
event
1076 409
Total inflow during sampling (m3/d) 306,019 251,741
Composite sampling interval (m3) 18.8 18.8












Ntot (mg/l) 42 54
Ptot (mg/l) 5.1 6.4
NH4-N (mg/l) 32 35
Abbreviations: BOD: biochemical oxygen demand; COD: chemical oxygen demand; TSS:
total suspended solids; Ntot: total nitrogen concentration; Ptot: total phosphorus concen-
tration; NH4-N: ammonium nitrate concentration.
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final concentrated sample while the rest of the concentrate was pre-
served at−75 °C for later use.
The detection andquantitation of the viral targets entailed the deter-
mination of the copy numbers of SARS betacoronavirus with an E-
Sarbeco assay (Corman et al., 2020) and of SARS-CoV-2 with an N2
assay (Medema et al., 2020b; Lu et al., 2020). Also, the copy numbers
of norovirus GII (Kauppinen and Miettinen, 2017) were analyzed.
2.3. The decay of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater stored at cold
temperatures
The decay characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were studied at the
time points of 0, 3, 7, 10, 14, and 21 days after the start of the experi-
ment. Additionally, the effect of long-term storage was tested at 4 °C
after 28 days and at −20 °C and −75 °C after 58 days. To reach suffi-
ciently high copy numbers for the experiment, the influent sample
taken during 24–25 May 2020 was spiked with a 1:1000 dilution of
SARS-CoV-2 inoculum prepared from the nasopharyngeal swab of a
COVID-19 patient. The produced spiked wastewater influent was di-
vided into 57 microcentrifuge tubes in portions of 300 μl. Triplicate
tubes were stored in the dark at temperatures of 4 °C, −20 °C, and
−75 °C and taken to direct nucleic acid extraction and subsequent re-
verse transcriptase-quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) analysis. Frozen sam-
ples were thawed on ice before the analysis. The copy numbers of
SARS betacoronavirus RNA were quantified with an E-Sarbeco assay.
The specificity of the E-Sarbeco assay was confirmed by Sanger se-
quencing of the selected PCR products. The presence and quantitation
of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the sample material was confirmed using the
N2 assay.
2.4. Nucleic acid extraction and the RT-qPCR of the viral targets
For nucleic acid extraction, a Chemagic Viral300 DNA/RNA extrac-
tion kit was used with a Chemagic-360D semi-automated nucleic acid
extraction instrument (Perkin-Elmer, USA). For inactivation, 300 μl of
Lysis Buffer 1 and 300 μl of the sample (concentrate or a re-suspended
pre-centrifugation pellet) were mixed and incubated in room tempera-
ture for at least 10 min. Poly(A) RNA and Proteinase K were added into
the lysates and the extraction protocol was executed according to the
manufacturer's instructions. Prior to downstreamanalysis, an additional
purification of the nucleic acids extracted from the pre-centrifugation3
pellets was done using a OneStep™ PCR Inhibitor Removal Kit (Zymo
Research, USA) according to the manufacturer's instructions.
The RT-qPCR assayswere performed using TaqMan Fast Virus 1-step
Master Mix and a QuantStudio 6 Flex real-time PCR system (Applied
Biosystems, ThermoFisher Scientific). The primer and probe sequences
are shown in Supplemental Table S1 and the reaction conditions in
the Supplemental Table S2. In brief, all RT-qPCR reactions contained
5 μl RNA sample in a final volume of 25 μl. For SARS betacoronavirus
quantitation with an E-Sarbeco assay targeting envelope protein
(Corman et al., 2020) and for norovirus GII quantitation (Kauppinen
and Miettinen, 2017), RT-qPCR reactions contained 0.4 μM primers
and a 0.2 μMprobe. For SARS-CoV-2, anN2 assay targeting nucleocapsid
protein (Medema et al., 2020b; Lu et al., 2020) was conducted in the
same manner except that both primers and probe were used in a final
concentration of 0.2 μM. The conditions were the same for the internal
process control using mengovirus according to ISO/TC 15216-1:2013,
except the final concentration of primers was 0.8 μM. For E-Sarbeco
and N2 assays, the thermal cycling conditions were as follows: 50 °C
for 5 min for reverse transcription, followed by 95 °C for 20 s, and
then 45 cycles of 95 °C for 15 s and 58 °C for 1min. All the reactions con-
sidered positive exhibited Ct value below 40. For norovirus GII and
mengovirus, the thermal cycling conditions were the same except the
annealing and extension was carried out in 60 °C instead of 58 °C (Sup-
plemental Table S2).
For quantitation of the RT-qPCR targets, standard curves for each run
were generated by using serial dilutions of control materials with a
known quantity. In the E-Sarbeco assay and N2 assay, control plasmids
pEX-A128-nCoV_E_Sarbeco (Eurofins, Luxembourg) and 2019_nCoV_N
Positive Control (IDT, USA)were used, respectively. Before use, the pEX-
A128-nCoV_E_Sarbeco plasmid (100 ng μl−1) was digested with
FastDigest NotI (ThermoScientific, USA) and purified using Illustra GFX
PCR DNA and a Gel Band Purification Kit (GE Healthcare, UK) according
to the manufacturer's instructions. For the N2 assay, the plasmid was
used without linearization following the manufacturer's instructions.
The quantitation of the norovirus GII assay was done using an artificial
gene fragment (gBlocks, IDT).
2.5. Confirmation of the SARS-CoV-2 target by sequencing
The selected PCR products from E-Sarbeco assay were run by gel
electrophoresis and approximately 113 bp long bands were cut from
the gel. The purification was done using a QIAquick Gel Extraction Kit
(Qiagen, Germany) and, further, the sequencingwas done in both direc-
tions by ABI BigDye™ v3.1 Chemistry (Applied Biosystems, USA) ac-
cording to the manufacturer's protocol. The sequences were verified
and aligned using Geneious 11.1.3 (Biomatters Ltd., New Zealand). The
pair-end gene sequence of the E gene PCR product generated from a
spiked wastewater sample was: ACTTCTTTTTCTTGCTTTCGTGGTATTCT
TGCTAGTTACACTAGCCATCCTTACTGCGCTTCGAT. The consensus se-
quence was identified using BLAST analysis (https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/Blast.cgi).
2.6. Safety measures, quality assurance, and controls
To ensure the safety of the laboratory work, wastewater and patient
samples were processed as pair-work in a level 2 biosafety cabinet
using cuffs, double gloves, and a laboratory coat. Only airtight sealed
tubes were handled outside the biosafety cabinet. Seventy per cent etha-
nolwas sprinkled on the outer surfaces of the tubes and airtight rotor lids
and also used during the opening of the centrifuge lid after a one- to two-
minutewaiting time following the centrifugation in order to prevent pos-
sible aerosols from entering into the air. To estimate the recovery effi-
ciency of the ultrafiltration method, an enveloped virus control similar
to SARS-CoV-2 was not available. Instead, a non-enveloped mengovirus
was used as an internal process control following the principles of
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VMC0 (ATCC VR-1597, CeeramTOOLS, France) was used.
Each RNA extraction set included reagent blanks (300 μl PBS or ster-
ile deionized water) and a SARS-CoV-2 positive process control (300 μl
of 1:500 diluted nasopharyngeal swab sample from a COVID-19 positive
patient, dissolved into PBS and inactivated at 60 °C for 90 min). In RT-
qPCR, standard curves and no template controls were included in each
run. RT-qPCR amplification efficiencies, as well as detection and quanti-
fication limits, are presented in Supplemental Table S3. The actual
wastewater volume analyzed for each PCR assay (ml) was 3.8–4.0 ml
for the authentic samples analyzed using the Centricon Plus-70 concen-
tration method and 0.07 ml in the inoculation experiment with direct
extraction. Where possible, extracted RNA samples and their ten-fold
dilutions were analyzed in duplicate. Ten-fold diluted samples were
used to estimate the presence of inhibition: inhibition was considered
significant if the gene copy number detected from the diluted sample
was two times higher than the gene copy number detected from theun-
diluted sample. When applicable, the average results from both the di-
luted and undiluted sample were used to generate the final data.
2.7. Statistics
The viral RNA copy numbers were log-transformed into log10 before
statistical analysis. The standard error with a 95% confidence interval
was calculated with the following formula:
SE 95%Confidence Intervalð Þ ¼ σffiffiffi
n
p ⁎t,
where σ is a standard deviation, n is the number of samples, and t is a
critical value at the probability level of 0.025 (two-tailed) from a t-
distribution table at (n-1) degrees of freedom.
The differences between the copy numbers in samples stored at the
different temperatures were compared with the Kruskal-Wallis test
followed with the Dunn post hoc test. The overlapping upper and
lower confidence interval of mean copy numbers from E-Sarbeco and
N2 assays generated from pellet and supernatant fractions were com-
pared, as previously described (Tiwari et al., 2019).
The decay characteristics at the storage temperatures were analyzed
with the GInaFiT Version 1.7 (Geeraerd and Van Impe InactivationTable 2
Themean copy numbers of virus RNAmarkers (mean± standard deviation, log10 copies 100 m
says in Viikinmäki WWTP influent wastewater sample taken 19–20 April 2020 and stored over
performed from triplicate aliquots. The number of replicates with results above the quantificat
Target Sample fraction Storage time (days) RNA copy number a
4 °C −
SARS E-Sarbeco Supernatant 29 2.6 ± 0.2 (2) <
64 3.1 ± 0.2 (3) 2
84 2.9 ± 0.3 (2) 2
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 2.8 ± 0.1
Pelleta 84 3.4 ± 0.2 (3) 2
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 3.2 ± 0.2
SARS-CoV-2 N2 Supernatant 29 3.7 ± 0.1 (2) 3
64 3.7 ± 0.2 (3) 3
84 3.7 ± 0.2 (2) 3
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 3.6 ± 0.1
Pelleta 84 4.2 ± 0.1 (3) 3
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 4.0 ± 0.2
Norovirus GII Supernatant 29 4.4 ± 0.2 (3) 4
64 3.7 ± 0.1 (3) 3
84 3.5 ± 0.1 (3) 3
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 4.0 ± 0.2
Pelleta 84 3.8 ± 0.2 (3) 3
Total mean ± SE (95% CI): 3.3 ± 0.3
a The analysis is performed for the particulate fraction (i.e., pellets from pre-centrifugation)
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Model Fitting Tool) freeware add-in for Microsoft® Office 365® Excel
(Geeraerd et al., 2005), as done earlier (Tiwari et al., 2019; Han et al.,
2020). GInaFiT is a commonly used tool for modeling the decay of mi-
crobes or their genetic markers. It tests nine different types of decay
model, such as log-linear and biphasic models. In the GInaFiT tool, the
regression analysiswas performed (log10(Nt) vs. time) for each viral tar-
get including the prediction of times needed for 90% and 99% reduction
at the storage temperatures in the wastewater influent, as previously
described by Casanova et al. (2009). Statistical analysis was done
using IBM SPSS statistics.
3. Results
The SARS betacoronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, and norovirus GII RNA were
detected from the wastewater sample collected during 19–20 April
2020 from the Viikinmäki WWTP, Helsinki, Finland. The quantity of
SARS betacoronavirus and SARS-CoV-2 RNA when stored at 4 °C,
−20 °C, and−75 °C and analyzed with E-Sarbeco and N2 assays, respec-
tively, remained stable at all storage temperatures for up to 84 days
(Table 2). At the same time, norovirus GII RNA copy numbers reduced
about 1-log10 during the time interval between 29 and 84 days of storage
(Table 2). The copy numbers of SARS betacoronavirus and SARS-CoV-2
RNA were slightly more frequently quantified with a higher total mean
from the pellet fraction of the samples stored for 84 days, that is, the par-
ticulate matter from the pre-centrifugation step, rather than from
ultrafiltrated supernatant fraction (Table 2, E-Sarbeco and N2 assays). At
the same time, with a non-enveloped virus type, norovirus GII, used as a
different reference to enveloped SARS and SARS-CoV-2 viruses, the target
mean difference in the quantified copy numbers between the pellet and
supernatant fractions was the opposite.
The obtained recovery efficiencies for the mengovirus process
control varied from 17.5% to 100.5% in supernatant fractions and were
considered sufficient (Supplemental Table S3). Mengovirus is also a
non-enveloped virus and was added to the samples just prior the
ultrafiltration. The range of mengovirus recovery rates from pre-
centrifugation pelletswas 0.4%–5.3% (Supplemental Table S3). Although
we used an additional purification of the nucleic acids extracted from
the pre-centrifugation pellets prior RT-qPCR, this step might not be es-
sential and the need depends on the sample and extraction kit proper-
ties in use in each laboratory.l−1) detected with SARS betacoronavirus E-Sarbeco, SARS-CoV-2 N2 and norovirus GII as-
84 days at 4 °C,−20 °C, and−75 °C. The analysis at each time and temperature point was
ion limit (LOQ) are shown in parenthesis.
t storage temperatures Quantification frequency (number of aliquots)
20 °C −75 °C
LOQ (0) 2.4 (1)
.8 ± 0.2 (3) 2.8 ± 0.0 (2)
.5 (1) 2.8 ± 0.3 (2)
Supernatant: 16/27 (59%)
.8 ± 0.5 (2) 3.3 ± 0.0 (2)
Pellet: 7/9 (78%)
.5 (1) 3.6 ± 0.1 (2)
.7 ± 0.1 (2) 3.7 ± 0.1 (2)
.4 (1) 3.6 ± 0.2 (3)
Supernatant: 18/27 (67%)
.9 ± 0.1 (2) 3.9 ± 0.4 (3)
Pellet: 8/9 (89%)
.8 ± 0.1 (3) 4.8 ± 0.1 (3)
.7 ± 0.1 (3) 3.8 ± 0.0 (3)
.6 ± 0.3 (3) 3.7 ± 0.1 (3)
Supernatant: 27/27 (100%)
.0 ± 0.1 (2) 3.0 ± 0.1 (3)
Pellet: 8/9 (89%)
. SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval.
Table 3
The decay characteristics of the SARS-CoV-2 spike (log10 copies 100 ml−1) in wastewater
influent at 4 °C, enumeratedwith E-Sarbeco and N2 assays. Samples stored at−20 °C and











E-Sarbeco 0.04 ± 0.2 0.59 0.15 16 52 105
N2 0.06 ± 0.0 0.99 0.00 11 36 73
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ple taken 19–20 April 2020 (Table 2) since during that time themethod
for the immediate analysis of the viral biomarkers from influent samples
was not available. Therefore, a Viikinmäki WWTP influent wastewater
sample taken five weeks later, during 24–25May 2020, was used to ex-
perimentally characterize the decay rate of SARS-CoV-2 RNA copy num-
bers during the first month of the cold storage of wastewater. Before
spiking, the sample contained the target RNA of the levels 3.1 and 3.8
log10 copies 100 ml−1 when analyzed using E-Sarbeco and N2 assays,
respectively. After a spike with a nasopharyngeal swab from a COVID-
19 patient, the copy numbers of the RNA targets in the beginning of
the experiment reached the level of 7.4 and 8.1 log10 copies 100 ml−1
in E-Sarbeco and N2 assays, respectively.
When the E-Sarbeco assay was used, no statistically significant dif-
ference between the storage temperatures was noted (Fig. 1, p =
0.258, Kruskal-Wallis), although after twoweeks of storage and thereaf-
ter, the sample aliquots stored at freezing temperatures (−20 °C and
−75 °C) seemed to produce higher quantities than refrigeration
(4 °C).When the N2 assay was used, a statistically significant difference
between the storage temperatures was observed (Fig. 1, p = 0.039,
Kruskal-Wallis). A linear decay of SARS-CoV-2 RNA was observed at
4 °C while no decay was visible within 58 days at the freezing tempera-
tures of−20 °C and−75 °C (Fig. 1). Regression analysis, calculatedwith
GInaFiT, was done for the sample aliquots stored at 4 °C (Table 3). The
decay was more linear and slightly faster when N2 was used as a target
(R2 = 0.99) when compared to E-Sarbeco assay results (R2 = 0.59).
4. Discussion
This is the first study reporting the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in
wastewater influent in Finland. The presence of the biomarkers of SARS-
CoV-2 in wastewater influent samples collected during April and May
2020 from Viikinmäki WWTP, Helsinki, Finland, is in agreement with
the national infectious disease register data regarding the confirmed
COVID-19 cases in themunicipalities of theViikinmäkiWWTP sewerage
network area preceding the sampling and with studies conducted ear-
lier in other countries (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2020a; Haramoto et al.,
2020; La Rosa et al., 2020a; Medema et al., 2020b; Mlejnkova et al.,Fig. 1. The decay curve of SARS-CoV-2 spike (log10 copies 100 ml−1) in wastewater influe
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2020; Arora et al., 2020). In the sample aliquots stored at 4 °C, −20 °C,
and −75 °C and analyzed after storage herein, the SARS-CoV-2 RNA
seemed surprisingly stable in these cold storage temperatures from
29days to 64 and 84days prior to carrying out the sample concentration
and nucleic acid extraction. Further, the results generated by spiking the
wastewater influentmatrixwith a diluted nasopharyngeal swab sample
from a COVID-19 patient and following the RNA signal from experiment
initiation (day 0) to 28 and 58 days in refrigerated and freezing condi-
tions, respectively, confirmed the stability of SARS-CoV-2 RNA, espe-
cially when stored in freezing temperatures.
A limitation of the study set-up was that we were not able to follow
SARS-CoV-2 copy numbers during the first 28 days of storage using the
real wastewater samples. Instead, we conducted a separate spike-in
study to reveal the decay characteristics between 0 and 28 days. The
conventional route of transmission of SARS betacoronaviruses is via re-
spiratory droplets passing through the nasopharynx. A nasopharyngeal
swab sample was used herein in order to gain high enough quantities of
SARS-CoV-2 for the spike-in experiment. However, the survival kinetics
of SARS-CoV-2 after passage through the gastrointestinal tract and, fur-
thermore, after the transport of the viral particles—first in the sewerage
system to theWWTP and then in a sample container to the laboratory—
might be different than those of a highly contagious nasopharyngeal
sample. While the finding of viral RNA in stools or wastewater does
not imply that the virus is viable and infectious (Foladori et al., 2020),
the two experiments carried out herein (the analysis of actual wastewa-
ter samples after storage and the spike-in study) both indicated the sta-
bility of the RNA signal during storage in freezing temperatures.
Therefore, this study has assumed the decay characteristics of the RNAnt at 4 °C, −20 °C, and−75 °C, enumerated with E-Sarbeco and N2 RT-qPCR assays.
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virus RNA from wastewater samples. The wastewater system repre-
sents virus particles that have ended up there from the fecal materials,
urine, coughing, sneezing, and sputum of infected people, with the ma-
jority of virus particles possibly originating from feces (WHO, 2020).
While the viruses previously analyzed by environmental microbiol-
ogists are most commonly non-enveloped viruses—such as poliovirus,
norovirus, adenovirus, or enterovirus—SARS-CoV-2 is an enveloped
virus. Currently, the protocols for SARS-CoV-2 testing from wastewater
samples vary a lot despite the multiple efforts to harmonize the virus
concentration and quantitation approaches (Hill et al., 2020; Kitajima
et al., 2020; Kordatou et al., 2020). As the aim is to detect the virus at
low concentrations in wastewater, the efficiency of the procedures
employed for sampling, preserving, and processing samples are critical
(Medema et al., 2020a) and there is a need for developing standardized
and reliable virus quantification protocols (Orive et al., 2020).
Interestingly, while the SARS-CoV-2 RNA remained almost stable at
4 °C, −20 °C, and −75 °C when the wastewater influent was stored
up to 84 days, norovirus reduced by about 1 log10 value during the
same time. This observation indicates that (actually against the current
belief; Hill et al., 2020) the persistency of non-enveloped viruses is not
necessarily higher than the persistence of enveloped viruses in cold en-
vironmental conditions. Based on previous reports, it is known that
coronaviruses decline rapidly at ambient temperatures in wastewater
(Ahmed et al., 2020b; Gundy et al., 2008; La Rosa et al., 2020b;
Silverman and Boehm, 2020). Wang et al. (2005) recovered SARS-
CoV-1 after at least 14 days in wastewater stored at 4 °C while they re-
ported it surviving only two days at 20 °C. Ye et al. (2016) concluded
that, with MHV surrogate, the inactivation kinetics of the enveloped vi-
ruses are significantly slower inwastewater at 10 °C compared to 25 °C.
Previously, with surrogate coronaviruses, transmissible gastroenteritis,
and MHV, Casanova et al. (2009) concluded that at 4 °C there was a
<1 log10 infectivity decrease for both viruses after four weeks. More re-
cently, Ahmed et al. (2020b) reported that, by using an N1 gene target
for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in untreated wastewater, the mean first-order
decay rate constant (k) for SARS-CoV-2 was 0.084/day at 4 °C. In the
present study, SARS-CoV-2 RNA copy numbers exhibited a linear
decay with a k value of 0.04 and 0.06 for N2 and E-Sarbeco gene targets
in wastewater, respectively, over 21 days when stored at 4 °C. On the
contrary, the RNA count in Viikinmäki WWTP influent remained un-
changed over 58 days in the wastewater influent stored at−20 °C and
−75 °C. Overall, the inactivation of coronaviruses in the wastewater
seems highly dependent on temperature. However, between the sam-
ples and sampling locations, the level of organic matter, and the pres-
ence of other microbes could affect the persistence.
Of the two biomarker assays for SARS-CoV-2 employed herein, the
SARS-CoV-2 RNAquantified using theN2 assay exhibited a slightly higher
decay rate than the SARS betacoronavirus RNA copy numbers obtained
using the E-Sarbeco assay. The slightly more rapid decay of the N2 assay
target compared with the E-Sarbeco assay target may indicate the differ-
ential decay rates of nucleocapsid and envelope genes (Mousavizadeh
andGhasemi, 2020).More information is needed on the stability of differ-
ent marker genes used for wastewater-based SARS-CoV-2 surveillance.
Overall, the information about the fate of enveloped viruses in municipal
wastewater has been scarce. When Ye et al. (2016) studied the survival
and partitioning behavior of model viruses in raw wastewater samples,
up to 26% of the enveloped MHV and Pseudomonas phage ϕ6 viruses
adsorbed to the solid fraction of wastewater compared with 6% of the
non-enveloped bacteriophages (MS2 and T3). Although more research
is needed, SARS-CoV-2 in WWTP influent could also be associated with
the particulate fraction of the sample.
It is noteworthy that the ultrafiltration method commonly used for
wastewater SARS-CoV-2 RNA analysis includes a pre-centrifugation
step, wherein part of the particulate fraction is removed from the anal-
ysis (Medema et al., 2020b). Such an approachmight not be optimal for
enveloped viruses such as SARS-CoV-2, aswas recently shown in aMHV6
surrogate study where concentration methods using both liquid and
solid fractions of wastewater produced the best yields (Ahmed et al.,
2020c). When we used the ultrafiltration method for the Viikinmäki
WWTP samples stored for 84 days at 4 °C, −20 °C, and −75 °C, the
quantification frequency and the quantities of SARS-CoV-2 RNA bio-
markers were slightly higher when analyzed from pre-centrifuged pel-
lets rather than from the water fraction without the particulate matter.
From the same samples, the quantification frequency and the copy
numbers of the norovirus RNA were on average higher when analyzed
from supernatants when compared with pellets. The finding may indi-
cate the higher affinity of an enveloped virus like SARS-CoV-2 to attach
onto the particulate matter of wastewater when compared with non-
enveloped viruses like norovirus. Indeed, instead of only studying
wastewater influent, research groups have recently reported SARS-
CoV-2 RNA detection in sewage sludge, proposing that the sludge
could serve as a better indicator for COVID-19 outbreak dynamics than
WWTP influent (Kocamemi et al., 2020; Peccia et al., 2020).
5. Conclusions
• SARS-CoV-2 RNAwas detected for the first time in the 24 h composite
influent wastewater sample collected from Viikinmäki WWTP,
Helsinki, Finland, during 19–20 April 2020.
• The SARS-CoV-2 RNA remained detectable during storage periods of
29, 64, and 84 days at 4 °C, −20 °C, and −75 °C when analyzed
using E-Sarbeco and N2 RT-qPCR assays.
• The SARS-CoV-2 RNA quantification frequency and copy numbers
were slightly higher when the particulate matter of the influent was
analyzed, compared with the pre-centrifuged supernatant fraction
used for ultrafiltration.
• In the sample pre-treatment procedures for ultrafiltration, the pellet
from the initial larger particle removal step should not be discarded
when the samples are analyzed after long-term storage. In the analy-
sis of fresh wastewater samples, the necessity to also analyze the pel-
let should be further investigated.
• A linear decay of spiked SARS-CoV-2 RNAwas observed at 4 °Cwhile no
decay was visible within 58 days at the freezing temperatures. In cases
when immediate SARS-CoV-2 RNA analysis from the wastewater influ-
ent is not possible, storage at−20 °C or−75 °C should be preferred.
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